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Abstract
In this paper, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game
with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. We show that joining a committee by
maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a
policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent. The disciplinary role of the
endogenous status quo and the heterogeneity of preferences within the committee are two
crucial ingredients to obtain this result. As a motivating example, this paper focuses on
the time consistency of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution by Kydland and Prescott (1977), it has been understood that,
absent commitment, the time inconsistency problem is pervasive in models of ￿scal and mone-
tary policy.
So far the standard framework to study dynamic consistency problems assumes that eco-
nomic policies are decided by a single, omnipotent policy maker. In practice, however, policy
makers do not have complete freedom of action, and most policies are made by collective
decision-making bodies (such as, monetary boards and legislatures). For example, Fry et al.
(1999) report that 79 central banks out of a sample of 88 use some form of committee structure
when deciding monetary policy. Motivated by this evidence, we model policy making as follows.
During every period a committee votes on the current policy. We assume that committee mem-
bers have di⁄erent ex ante preferred policies. In other words, if they could decide for the entire
committee and they had commitment, they would choose di⁄erent policies. Policy changes are
proposed by an agenda setter (or chairman). We suppose that the agenda setter is ￿xed over
time and places a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er before the committee. If the proposal does not obtain
a majority of votes, the current default option (which coincides with the status quo policy) is
maintained until the next voting game. In case of approval, the policy accepted today becomes
the new status quo for the next period. The current status quo is then a state variable.
The implications in terms of time consistency of the optimal policy are noticeable: under
some conditions, dynamic consistency problems are reduced. That is, making decisions as a
committee works as a substitute for a commitment technology, as a device for restraining the
behavior of policy makers.1 As we will see, the disciplinary role of the endogenous status quo
will be key for our result. Consequently, this paper provides a possible justi￿cation for why in
many policy decisions the default outcome is often the status quo.2
The intuition explaining why committee decision making is time consistent is as follows.
Suppose that the initial status quo coincides with the ex ante optimal policy outcome for
1Incidentally, notice that the words committee and commitment share the same etymology: from Latin,
committere; to entrust (from com- + mittere; to send).
2On this point, see Tsebelis (2002, p. 8). Rasch (2000) identi￿es the countries where this provision is part of
the formal rules. Voting models featuring an endogenous status quo are rare. Exceptions include Baron (1996),
Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Bullard and Waller (2004), Bernheim et al. (2006), and Fong (2006).
2the entire economy (sometimes called the Ramsey outcome). For the sake of the argument,
assume that the status quo coincides with the policy that the agenda setter would choose if
he had commitment. Suppose that consumers expect the committee to implement the Ramsey
outcome. Do policy makers betray consumers? Our answer is, under some conditions, no. We
obtain this result because a deviation changes the default option in the next voting game and,
consequently, might decrease the future negotiating power of the agenda setter. The cost of
betraying consumers is large when the deviation moves to an absorbing state: this happens
when the new status quo is a policy that a majority of policy makers prefer. Therefore, in spite
of the one-shot bene￿t from deviating, the agenda setter, when he looks forward via the status
quo, may have an incentive to make the ￿right￿decision.
We emphasize that our result can be applied to many settings where credibility problems
arise. As a motivating example, the focus of this paper is on the time consistency of monetary
policy. In our opinion, the dynamic voting game that we have described resembles the actual
policy making process in a monetary policy committee.3 In particular, the assumption that
one committee member controls the agenda seems quite plausible: monetary boards are often
dominated by strong chairmen (e.g., Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker, and Alan Greenspan), who
are nonetheless checked by the requirement that they must induce a majority of committee
members to assent to their point of view.
The idea that institutional constraints induce policy stickiness and reduce credibility prob-
lems is not new.4 A simple way to solve time-consistency problems through committees would
be to assume that central bankers who do not have any incentive to betray consumers belong
to the committee and have veto power. In this case, deviations from the Ramsey policy would
3Consider, for example, the voting procedure in Europe since January 1999. The decision making body of
the European Central Bank (ECB) includes 19 members. Each of the members has one vote. According to the
statute of the ECB, monetary policy is decided by simple majority rule; if the vote is tied, the ECB￿ s President
has a deciding vote. More details can be found at: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_2.pdf. Note
that the procedure that we have just described is common to other monetary policy committees, including the
FOMC.
4Kydland and Prescott (1980) themselves ￿rst hinted at a similar outcome when they conjectured that
￿institutional constraints may result in the time consistent solution being nearly optimal.￿ Along the same
lines, North and Weingast (1989) argue that the establishment of institutions of limited monarchy in England
after 1688 improved the ability of the Crown to credibly commit to repay the debt.
3not be approved. We emphasize that this is not the intuition behind our paper. In fact, our
result holds even when all committee members have a one-shot incentive to deviate from the ex
ante optimal policy. In spite of this incentive, the optimal outcome is sustained by the threat
of disagreement in the continuation game that follows a deviation; the threat is credible since
we posit a committee where policy makers have di⁄erent ex ante preferred policies. 5 The fact
that we are able to sustain the optimal outcome in the shadow of disagreement is, to the best
of our knowledge, a novel and general result that goes beyond the actual application of this
paper.
A further remark is in order. In our model, a simple majority is required to pass a policy
change. Consequently, the committee is not necessarily stuck after any deviation.6 For instance,
when the status quo is a high in￿ ation rate, a majority of committee members will be willing to
lower the current in￿ ation rate. In order to argue that separation of power leads to commitment,
we will have to show that the agenda setter does not deviate to a high in￿ ation rate where the
threat of disagreement is not credible.7
We stress that our solution to the time consistency problem does not rely on history-
dependent strategies. In fact, we adopt Markov perfection as a solution concept. For the
past years a growing literature has analyzed credibility problems without using trigger strate-
gies and, instead, supposed that the government and consumers use Markov strategies (for
example, Klein, et al. 2008). Usually, Markov perfect equilibria are characterized by solving
the functional Euler equation of the policy maker; in order to do so, policy rules are restricted
to being di⁄erentiable. In our model, policy rules are not di⁄erentiable. Consequently, we fol-
5Notice that in our model, the agenda setter chooses not to propose deviations from his optimal in￿ ation rate
as opposed to being forced to do so. This distinction would have practical consequences if we were to introduce
shocks that change the optimal policy of each committee member. Intuitively, our committee would be more
responsive to shocks than a committee that does not deviate because conservative central bankers have veto
power. Introducing uncertainty in a model with an endogenous default and credibility problems is, however, a
daunting task.
6If we required unanimity (or a large super-majority) to pass a policy change, we would further diminish
credibility problems by reducing the chance that deviations are passed and by making more credible the threat
of disagreement after a deviation. For realism, in our voting game decisions are made under simple majority
rule.
7The characterization of the proposal strategy when the default policy is a high in￿ ation rate is somewhat
involved. In some cases, before lowering the in￿ ation rate, the committee increases the in￿ ation rate.
4low a di⁄erent route: we construct a strategy pro￿le and we verify that there are no pro￿table
deviations from it. Constructing such a policy rule is particularly challenging because we must
look for a ￿xed point that solves the voting game among the committee members as well as the
policy game between the committee and the private sector.
We conclude this section by mentioning a possible objection to our result. When the optimal
policy for the entire economy does not coincide with the ex ante preferred policy by the agenda
setter, making decisions through committees is welfare improving for the agenda setter (since
he can sustain his preferred policy), but not necessarily from the economy￿ s perspective. In
Section 4.4 we analyze this objection, and show how to sustain the optimal in￿ ation ￿U for the
entire economy, even when it does not coincide with the chairman￿ s ex ante preferred policy. In
order to do so, a Grand Planner has to appropriately select the agenda setter of the committee
and choose the initial status quo. We show that, in some circumstances, there is a case for
selecting a liberal agenda setter, whose preferred in￿ ation rate is higher than ￿U. The fact
that our argument still works with a liberal agenda setter highlights the di⁄erences between
our paper and the conservative banker￿ s solution proposed by Rogo⁄ (1985).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 describes the model. In Section 4, we characterize the politico-economic equilibrium without
commitment. Section 4.1 provides an explanatory example to build intuition. Sections 4.2-4
analyze the general model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1977) pointed out that governments face a time
consistency problem. Since then, the literature has explored mechanisms that substitute for
commitment and make credibility problems less severe.
A very large literature has modeled the interaction between the government and the private
sector as an in￿nitely repeated game and used folk theorem-type results to show that the
commitment solution can be supported in equilibrium even when the government cannot bind
its future choices.8 In those studies, agents￿strategies specify each period￿ s action as a function
8For instance, see Barro and Gordon (1983b), Stokey (1989), Chari and Kehoe (1990), Chang (1998), and
Phelan and Stacchetti (2001).
5of the entire history of play. In this paper, instead, we rule out the possibility to extend memory
beyond what is included in the ￿payo⁄-relevant￿state of the game.9
Another body of literature assumes that the type of policy maker is unobserved by the
private sector (see Celentani and Pesendorfer, 1996, and Phelan, 2003). Households form
beliefs about the government￿ s type: policy makers are either opportunistic (if they like to
break promises) or trustworthy. In such a framework, deviations from promises destroy the
belief that the policy maker is not opportunistic. The long-run cost of betraying public trust
may be su¢ cient to induce all policy makers to keep promises. In our model, all policy makers
are opportunistic, and consumers know it.
Persson and Tabellini (1994) introduce politics into the picture. They deal with time in-
consistency in a model of capital taxation with heterogenous agents. Their paper shows that
the median voter is able to implement his preferred policy by electing a ￿more conservative￿
candidate (that is, a person who is more endowed with capital), who, once in o¢ ce, sets a
capital tax that matches the median voter￿ s ex ante optimal policy. This result is related to
Rogo⁄ (1985), who studies strategic delegation in a model of monetary policy. In contrast to
this literature, in Section 4.4 we show that, in some circumstances, it is optimal to choose an
agenda setter that is more liberal than the median. Compared to strategic delegation, our solu-
tion to the time-consistency problem is more convenient when preferences are not observed or
when it is not possible to ￿nd an agent that is immune from credibility problems (recall, in fact,
that our solution works even when all policy makers in the committee have a one-shot incentive
to betray consumers). Moreover, in a model with uncertainty, delegation may be problematic
when the agent and the principal are not subject to the same shocks.
Our paper is also related to the literature on legislative bargaining. In a seminal paper,
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) consider a legislature with n members who want to divide a dollar
among themselves by playing a non-cooperative bargaining game. Their framework has recently
been used by Battaglini and Coate (2008) to study the dynamic evolution of public debt,
taxation and public spending. In Bassetto (2008), two overlapping generations Nash-bargain
over tax rates, transfers, and government spending. In his model, the current policy decision,
by a⁄ecting capital accumulation, changes the strategic position of each generation in the next
9For this reason, simplicity is often cited among the advantages of Markov strategies relative to history-
dependent strategies. See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for further discussion on Markov perfect equilibria.
6negotiation. The endogeneity of the negotiation power will be a distinctive feature of our model
as well.
To conclude, we discuss the literature on monetary policy committees. Our focus here is
on those papers that mainly deal with dynamic consistency problems.10 Sibert (2003) studies
whether individual central bankers have more or less incentives to build a reputation than
a committee as a whole and suggests several institutional features that enhance reputation
building of committees. Dal B￿ (2006) shows that committee decision making under a super-
majority voting rule is able to deliver the ideal balance between commitment and ￿ exibility.
Bullard and Waller (2004) analyze alternative institutional arrangements in the context of a
general equilibrium model with overlapping generations. They show that constitutional rules
that give the older generation veto power over changes in monetary policy implement the social
optimum in a politico-economic equilibrium. In contrast to their model, in our setup all policy
makers at each point in time are tempted to betray consumers. In spite of that, in our model
the committee is disciplined by the threat of disagreement o⁄ the equilibrium path.
3 Voting over Monetary Policy in a Committee
We consider a currency area with n + 1 regions. Let n be odd. Each region i; with i 2 N =
f1;:::;ng, has a voting representative in a monetary policy committee. Besides the n voting
representatives, the committee includes an agenda setter (or proposer), indexed by p, whose
task is to place a proposal before the committee. The set of all committee members is denoted
by N = N [ fpg.
Time is discrete and the horizon is in￿nite. The in￿ ation rate from t ￿ 1 to t is denoted
as ￿t 2 X, where X = [￿min;￿max] ￿ R. In each period t the committee votes directly on the
time-t in￿ ation rate for the entire currency area. We assume that the committee is able to
10Most of the literature on monetary policy boards abstracts from credibility problems. In Waller (1992, 2000),
committees improve welfare since they reduce the policy uncertainty associated with the electoral outcome.
Another strand of literature sees information sharing as the main rationale for committee decision making. In
an experimental study, Blinder and Morgan (2005) show that group decision making is better than individual
decision making when the members in the committee have di⁄erent signals about the (uncertain) potential
output.
7Figure 1: Timing of Events
perfectly control ￿t.
We posit a simple Barro-Gordon economy for the currency area. Employment xt is deter-
mined by
xt = ￿ + (￿t ￿ ￿
e
t); (1)
where ￿ is a positive constant, which we interpret as the natural rate of employment. The term
￿e
t is the expected in￿ ation rate in the currency area.



















The discount factor is denoted by ￿ 2 (0;1). The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1) is the relative weight
on employment deviations from the target
_
x. The ex ante optimal in￿ ation rate for member
i is denoted by
_
￿i. We could justify the di⁄erent target in￿ ation rates as a consequence of
(unmodeled) heterogeneity across the regions of the currency area or as a result of di⁄erent
distributional concerns among committee members. With respect to the latter justi￿cation,
the argument may go as follows. Since the poor hold more cash as a function of their total
purchases (see, on this point, Erosa and Ventura, 2002), low income individuals are more
vulnerable to anticipated in￿ ation relative to high income individuals.11 Conversely, agents
with high earning ability bear a larger share of the labor income tax burden. As shown by
Albanesi (2005, 2007), distributional considerations may then determine signi￿cant departures
from the Friedman rule. This argument may then explain why some policy makers, depending
on the weights in their social welfare function, may rely more heavily on the in￿ ation tax than
others.
11On the basis of household polling data, Easterly and Fisher (2001) ￿nd that the poor are more likely than
the rich to mention in￿ ation as a top concern.
8The median in the committee is de￿ned as per usual. Order the n voting representatives so
that central banker 1 is the one with the smallest target in￿ ation, and individual n is the one
with the largest target in￿ ation, and ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿n: The median representative is the one
with the index m = (n + 1)=2:
In most of the paper, we suppose that ￿ 2 (0;1). In this case, assuming that
_
x > ￿, the
committee has an incentive to generate unexpected in￿ ation to bring the actual employment
closer to the employment target. As a benchmark, in Section 4.2 we consider the case ￿ = 0.
This paper analyzes two interrelated decision problems: the policy makers￿decision problem
in the voting game and the consumers￿problem. We formulate the private agent￿ s problem as
in Sargent (1999). At the beginning of time t consumers set price expectations; afterwards, the
committee meets (see Figure 1 for the timing of events). We suppose that each region of the
currency area includes a continuum of consumers distributed on the interval [0;1]. Consumers
are denoted by the index j: The choice variable of consumer j in region i is the anticipated
in￿ ation rate, denoted by ￿
e j
i;t . The average setting of ￿
e j
i;t is the expected in￿ ation rate in the
currency area, ￿e
t. We de￿ne the one-period payo⁄ to a private agent as
u(￿
e j




The private sectors behave competitively. Each in￿nitesimal consumer takes ￿t as given, since
he correctly perceives that his own actions have no in￿ uence on the policy that will be decided
by the committee. From (3) each private agent maximizes his payo⁄by setting ￿
e j
i;t = ￿t. That
is, the private sector￿ s objective is to correctly forecast the in￿ ation rate that the committee
will select.
The policy makers are the only strategic players in our model. In each period a non-
cooperative voting game takes place among the policy makers. We will assume a voting protocol
that gives the agenda setter the power of making take-it-or-leave-it proposals to the committee.
This is not meant to be a literal description of actual policy making. Instead, it is a modeling
device to capture the idea that chairmen usually have more power and in￿ uence than the other
committee members. In some monetary policy committees, however, chairmen do seem to
control the agenda. Referring to the US Fed, Alan Blinder, who served on the FOMC, argues:
￿In practice, each member other than Alan Greenspan has only one real choice
when the roll is called: whether to go on record as supporting or opposing the
9chairman￿ s recommendation. ... It is therefore quite possible for the Fed to adopt
one policy even though the (unweighted) majority favors another.￿ 12
At the same time, Blinder (2004) also emphasizes that it would be incorrect to claim that
Alan Greenspan was the de facto single decision maker in the FOMC. First of all, because the
FOMC chairman lacks the formal authority to dictate monetary policy. Second, because there
exists anecdotal evidence that at least to some extent, the ￿nal proposal by Alan Greenspan
has been in￿ uenced by the internal debate.13
The policy choice that is negotiated in period t is ￿t. In period t + 1 a new bargaining
game takes place to decide ￿t+1; and so on, for all t. The negotiation game unfolds with players
making proposals and with the other players accepting or rejecting the o⁄er. In most bargaining
models, the agenda setter is chosen either randomly or is determined by the ￿protocol￿(a ￿xed
order over the players). Throughout the paper, we assume that the agenda setter p is ￿xed
over time.14 Voting unfolds as follows: at time t the agenda setter (or chairman) makes a
take-it-or-leave-it proposal ￿t 2 X: After the proposal is placed before the committee, all i 2 N
simultaneously vote on ￿t. (The assumption that the agenda setter does not cast a vote is
not essential for our results.) A simple majority is required to pass a proposal: that is, if
jfi 2 N : i accepts ￿tgj ￿ (n + 1)=2; ￿t is accepted; if not, the status quo qt is implemented.
The status quo is endogenous: if ￿t is rejected, the status quo qt is maintained in the next
bargaining game; if ￿t is approved, ￿t becomes the status quo for the next period.
3.1 The Agenda Setter￿ s Dynamic Programming Problem
We focus attention on stationary Markov strategies, where the past a⁄ects current behavior
only through its e⁄ect on a state variable. In stating the problem recursively, we get rid of the
time indexes. The current status quo q is given by the previous in￿ ation rate, q = ￿￿1; while the
in￿ ation rate chosen in the current period is denoted by ￿. Given that the status quo matters in
12See Blinder (2004, p.47). The tradition of dominance by the chairman did not originate with Greenspan:
￿Paul Volker￿ s dominance was also legendary.￿(Blinder, 2004, p. 47).
13Along the same lines, Laurence Meyer (Meyer, 2004) remarks on ￿[Greenspan]￿ s disproportionate in￿ uence
on FOMC decisions￿ and on ￿his e⁄orts to build consensus around his policy recommendations￿ (p. 50).
However, Mayer also notes that the chairman ￿does not necessarily always get his way￿(p. 52).
14The standard reference for voting games with a ￿xed agenda setter is Romer and Rosenthal (1978).
10our voting game, consumers use ￿￿1 to predict the policy decision that the committee will make.
Since all agents are identical and they all face the same problem, in a symmetric equilibrium
￿
e j
i = ￿e for all j and i. The stationary strategy of the private sectors is then described by
an aggregate expectation rule ￿: X ! X. Expected in￿ ation is ￿e = ￿(￿￿1). The state of
the economy at the time the negotiations take place is denoted by ’ = (￿￿1;￿e) 2 X2. In
each period a stationary strategy for the agenda setter p is a proposal rule Gp : X2 ! X: The
proposal rule indicates what the agenda setter proposes to the committee for any given state ’.
For all i 2 N a strategy is simply a voting rule: Gi : X3 ! faccept, rejectg: In other words,
for a given state ’ and for a given proposal ￿, policy maker i must either accept or reject the
o⁄er. We require players to use stage-undominated voting rules (see Baron and Kalai, 1993).
This amounts to saying that
Gi(’;￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
accept ￿, if
wi(￿;￿e) + ￿Vi(￿;￿(￿)) ￿ wi(￿￿1;￿e) + ￿Vi(￿￿1;￿(￿￿1))
reject; otherwise
9
> > > =
> > > ;
;
where Vi is the value function of representative i.15 The condition above implies that player i
votes for proposal ￿ if and only if the utility of accepting ￿ and continuing to the next period
with a new status quo is at least that of rejecting the proposal and continuing to the next
period with the current status quo. The voting decision of each representative is made taking
as given ￿ and Gp: In equilibrium, the rules that the voting representatives expect consumers
and the agenda setter to follow in the continuation game are the correct ones. We de￿ne the
acceptance set A(’) as the set of proposals that obtains a majority of votes when the state is
’. More formally,
A(’) = f￿ 2 X : jfi 2 N : i accepts ￿gj ￿ (n + 1)=2g: (4)
As shown by Proposition A1 in the Appendix, a proposal will be accepted by the committee
if and only if it is accepted by the median.16 This result greatly simpli￿es the analysis since it
15This requirement is standard. It rules out equilibria where all players accept a proposal they do not like
because a single rejection would not change the voting outcome.
16We obtain this result by showing that preferences satisfy an order restriction, as discussed in Rothstein
(1990). This allows us to conclude that for any possible proposal, the policy makers that prefer the status quo
all lie to one side of those preferring the proposal. One advantage of assuming quadratic utilities, besides their
11makes the characterization of the equilibrium depend only on the utilities of the median and of
the agenda setter.
Before moving on, we give a de￿nition. A policy ￿ is said to be static if, whenever the status
quo coincides with that policy, the status quo is proposed and passed in every period.





e) + ￿Vp(￿;￿(￿);￿;G￿p)g: (5)
The maximization in each period is done for a given state variable ’ = (￿￿1;￿e), taking as
given ￿ and the strategies of the other players, which are denoted by G￿p. Without any loss
of generality we consider only equilibria where p proposes policies that are accepted by the
committee.17 In fact, proposing a policy outside A(’) is equivalent to proposing the status
quo, which is always accepted.
Next, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that
_
￿m is greater than
_
￿p and that the
extent of disagreement between the median and the agenda setter is su¢ ciently large.





￿p + [1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]￿(
_
x ￿ ￿)=(1 + ￿).
It is important to note that the assumption that the agenda setter is more conservative than
the median is not essential to our results. In fact, in Section 4.4 we will suppose that the agenda
setter is more liberal than the median. What is important is the existence of disagreement within
the committee, which is measured by the distance between the ideal points of the median and
of the agenda setter. In many committees, this is a quite plausible assumption. For example,
a large empirical literature has pointed out that district bank presidents in the FOMC tend to
prefer tighter monetary policy than members of the Board of Governors.18
tractability and the fact of being overwhelmingly adopted by the related literature, is to satisfy this condition. If
preferences were only single-peaked but not order-restricted, note that proposals may be accepted by a coalition
that does not include the median. For a discussion, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1999, ch. 4).
17On the basis of FOMC transcripts for the period 1987 to 1996, Chappell et al. (2005, p. 186) conclude that
￿there are at least suggestions that Greenspan￿ s proposals were crafted with knowledge of what other members
might ￿nd acceptable.￿
18See, for example, Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), and Gildea (1992). In the Bank of
England, there seems to be a division between external members and internal ones (see Gerlach-Kristen, 2003).
12To simplify the characterization of the equilibrium, we make a second assumption, which
is nonetheless defendable on grounds of realism. We suppose that all committee members are
dismissed if employment falls much below the natural level ￿. Let ￿ denote a positive and
su¢ ciently large constant.
ASSUMPTION 2: When the current employment x falls below ￿ ￿￿; all policy makers are
replaced by other representatives with the same preferences. For all i 2 N, the cost in utility
terms of being replaced is equal to B:
Looking at equation (1), one can see that employment falls below ￿ only when the committee
generates a de￿ationary surprise. We assume that B is su¢ ciently large so that the committee
never generates a de￿ ation surprise that brings employment below ￿ ￿ ￿.
Solving the model amounts to ￿nding a ￿xed point of the policy rules followed by the
committee, so that, given that in future the committee will follow those rules, the committee is
going to follow the same rules in the current period. Moreover, in any pure-strategy equilibrium
the private sector correctly anticipates the decision rules of the committee members. This
implies that along the equilibrium path employment is at its natural level.19
DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM: A politico-economic equilibrium without commitment
(PEC) is a proposal rule Gp : X2 ! X, a voting rule Gi : X3 ! faccept;rejectg for all voting
representatives i 2 N, an aggregate expectation rule ￿ : X ! X; and an individual expectation
rule ￿
j
i : X ! X for all i 2 N and j 2 [0;1]; such that:
1. for all i 2 N and j 2 [0;1], the expectation rule ￿
j
i of consumer j in region i maximizes
(3), for given strategies of the committee and for given ￿;
2. for all ’ 2 X2; the proposal rule Gp solves the right hand side of (5), given G￿p and given
￿;
3. for all ’ 2 X2 and for all proposals; all i 2 N use stage-undominated voting rules Gi,
given the strategies of the other policy makers and given ￿,
19Our equilibrium concept, which combines features of classical competitive analysis and game theory, bears
some resemblance to Chang (1995) and Bassetto (2008).
13Figure 2: One-period Payo⁄
4. for all i 2 N and j 2 [0;1], the individual expectation rule is consistent with the aggregate
expectation rule: that is, ￿
j
i(￿￿1) = ￿(￿￿1), for all ￿￿1 2 X:
4 Policy Making without Commitment
4.1 A Sketch of the Argument: Examples
This subsection considers simple policy games with a discrete policy space in order to provide
the intuition behind our result. We will compare the traditional setup, where a single central
banker has complete freedom to choose the in￿ ation rate, to ours, where decisions are made by
voting.
4.1.1 Traditional Setup
Consider an economy with a continuum of identical consumers. In￿ ation can only take two
values: ￿ 2 fa;bg; where a < b: Consider the one-shot policy game between the central banker
and the private sector. The timing of choices is as before. Consumers form expectations
forecasting the in￿ ation rate that the central banker will select. The payo⁄s to the central
banker are shown in Figure 2. For example, 4 is the payo⁄ of choosing b when the private
sector expected a. Notice that the outcome (b;￿e = a) is not a rational expectations equilibrium
because consumers are not optimizing: given that b is expected and given that a is chosen by
all other consumers, each in￿nitesimal agent would choose b to maximize his payo⁄. Since
all consumers are alike, aggregate and individual expectations would be inconsistent. The
only rational expectations equilibria (shown in bold) are (b;￿e = b) and (a;￿e = a). The
Ramsey outcome is de￿ned as the best equilibrium within this set. Note that in the absence
14Figure 3: One-period Payo⁄s to P and M
of commitment, the Ramsey outcome (a;￿e = a) is not a subgame perfect equilibrium because
the central banker would have an incentive to deviate and choose b when ￿e = a: The only
subgame perfect equilibrium is (b;￿e = b). The di⁄erence b ￿ a > 0 is the well-known in￿ ation
bias.
4.1.2 Our Setup
Suppose that decisions are made according to the protocol described in Section 3. For simplicity,
in this example we assume that the committee includes only two members, P and M, bargaining
over ￿; where ￿ 2 fa;bg: Policy maker P, the agenda setter, places a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er
and M chooses whether to accept it or reject it. If the proposal is rejected, the status quo is
maintained. Once a proposal is passed, the current policy becomes the status quo for the next
voting game. Time is discrete and in￿nite. The payo⁄s are shown in Figure 3. Each matrix
indicates the policy makers￿payo⁄s for a given expected in￿ ation. The two members have
di⁄erent ex ante preferred policies: a is the target in￿ ation of P, while b is the target in￿ ation
of M. The matrices show that both P and M gain from generating unexpected in￿ ation when
￿e = a; they also show that generating unexpected de￿ ation when ￿e = b is costly for both
representatives.
Herein, we show that when the agenda setter is su¢ ciently patient, policy a is sustained
by a politico-economic equilibrium. Consider the following stationary Markov strategy pro￿le.
First, we suppose that the private sector expects the current policy to be static:
￿(a) = a, ￿(b) = b:
Second, we posit the following proposal strategy and acceptance sets for all pairs ’ of status





a if ’ = (a;a);





fa;bg if ’ = (a;a);
fbg if ’ = (b;b):
For instance, when ￿￿1 and ￿e are both equal to a; our strategy pro￿le prescribes that P
proposes a and M accepts policies a and b.
To see whether the above strategy pro￿le is sustained by a PEC, we check that the proposal
rule is perfect, the acceptance sets are optimal (that is, the voting rules are stage-undominated)
and expectations are correct.
To prove that proposing a when ’ = (a;a) is perfect, we show that there are no pro￿table
one-period deviations.21 Note that a one-period deviation to b would be feasible since b 2
A(a;a). To decide whether or not to propose b, the agenda setter evaluates the cost and the
bene￿t of betraying consumers. From our expectation rule, in the period that follows the
deviation consumers correctly expect b.22 Moreover, since A(b;b) does not include policy a;
member M is expected to veto any proposal that brings the in￿ ation rate back to a. Therefore,
this deviation introduces a long-run cost for the agenda setter. If ￿ ￿ 1=2 the long-run cost
compensates the current bene￿t and, consequently, a is a static policy. The proposal GP(b;b) =
b is perfect because a deviation to a is rejected. Next, we check that the acceptance sets are
optimal given that the above pro￿le describes what happens if the proposal is rejected. First,
notice that when players use stage-undominated voting rules, the status quo is always accepted.
This is why both acceptance sets contain the status quo. Moreover, accepting policy b when
’ = (a;a) is stage-undominated because it would cause an in￿ ation surprise and move the
20For brevity, we do not write down the strategies that are never played by the committee given the expectation
rule that we have postulated. This is why we consider only two states: (a;a) and (b;b): We remind the reader
that the ￿rst (second) component of ’ denotes the current status quo (expected in￿ ation).
21According to the One-Stage Deviation Principle, this is a su¢ cient requirement for Markov perfection since
our game is continuous at in￿nity. See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 108). Notice that after a
one-period deviation the agenda setter conforms to the strategy pro￿le described in the text.
22In our model, expectations correctly anticipate the outcome of the equilibrium strategy after any history,
not just along the equilibrium path.
16in￿ ation rate permanently to b: On the other hand, accepting policy a when ’ = (b;b) is not
stage-undominated because it would cause a (costly) de￿ ation surprise and move the in￿ ation
rate permanently to a. Finally, notice that the private sector optimizes (i.e., expectations are
correct).
We therefore conclude that when ￿ ￿ 1=2 policy a is sustained by a PEC. If the current
status quo is equal to a, in all subsequent periods the committee will implement policy a despite
the temptation of both policy makers to deviate to b: This result is obtained because P and M
have opposite preferences on the equilibrium path: the fact that b is the ex ante preferred policy
by M makes the threat of disagreement after the deviation credible. If b were not static, which
amounts to saying that in equilibrium we would have ￿(b) = a and GP(b;a) = a, one-period
deviations from a would not be costly anymore and policy a could not be sustained by a PEC.
In the remainder of this section, we argue that policy a cannot be static when the committee
is homogenous (that is, when the preferences of P and M are aligned) or when the default policy
is not endogenous.
REMARK 1: Suppose that M has the same preferences as P. Policy a; which is now the
optimal policy for the entire committee, cannot be sustained by a PEC even when ￿ ￿ 1=2.
Recall from the previous discussion that policy a is static only if b is static. To prove that
policy a cannot be supported in a homogenous committee, we ￿rst show that for a su¢ ciently
large ￿ policy b cannot be static when a is static. Indeed, suppose by way of contradiction that
policies a and b are both static. We claim that there exists a pro￿table deviation. When b is the
status quo and expectations are equal to b, the committee is tempted to generate a de￿ ation
surprise. This deviation, which is costly in the current period since both members obtain a
payo⁄ of 1:5 instead of 2, would change the state variable in the next period and permanently
move the economy to a: When ￿ > 1=3, the long-run bene￿t from deviating is greater than
the short-run cost. Therefore, policy b cannot be static when ￿ is greater than 1=3. Second,
recall that even if b is static, policy a cannot be implemented when ￿ ￿ 1=2. Therefore, we
conclude that the only rational expectations equilibrium is (b;￿e = b) starting from any status
quo. Intuitively, a committee where policy makers do not disagree on the optimal policy is
equivalent to having a single legislator. Then we obtain the standard result in the literature:
credibility problems arise.
17REMARK 2: If the default policy is ￿xed, policy a cannot be sustained by a PEC.
To prove the above claim, consider a committee with heterogenous preferences, as in Figure
3, but assume that the default policy in case of disagreement is ￿xed and equal to a.23 We
show that b and a cannot be both static for su¢ ciently large ￿. Indeed, suppose that a and b
are both static and that b is the current status quo. Consider the following deviation. Instead
of staying in b, a su¢ ciently patient agenda setter would propose policy a even if consumers
expected b: Policy maker M dislikes moving to a, but cannot avoid the de￿ ation surprise even
if he rejects the proposal because a rejection implements the default policy a. As a result, in
equilibrium b is not static and, consequently, policy a cannot be sustained by a PEC.
Before concluding this example, notice that committee decision making is not time consistent
anymore if the voting game has a ￿nite horizon. This happens since the proposal is pinned
down in the last period T. At time T; a deviation to b is implemented, since changing the
status quo is not costly anymore. At time T ￿1, the agenda setter knows that he will move the
status quo at time T: consequently, a deviation to b becomes pro￿table; and so on, for all t.24
4.2 A Benchmark Case: The General Model with ￿ = 0
We now come back to the general model where the policy space is equal to the interval
[￿min;￿max] and proposals are passed by majority rule. As a benchmark, we start by con-
sidering the case when there are no incentives to surprise the private sector: Proposition 1
characterizes a politico-economic equilibrium for the dynamic game with ￿ = 0: To simplify the
notation, for all status quo we write the proposal strategy Gp(q;￿(q)) as Gp(q), knowing that
in equilibrium expectations are correct: that is, ￿(q) = Gp(q;￿(q)) for all q:



















23If the default is ￿xed at b; policy a cannot be sustained either since the proposal GP (a;a) = a would be
clearly rejected by M:
24Since in practice committee members have ￿nite (and often staggered) terms of o¢ ce, we are implicitly
assuming that each committee member is replaced by another policy maker with the same preferences and that
members care about policy outcomes that occur after the end of their mandates.
















In equilibrium, proposals are approved and expectations are rational.
Proof: See the Appendix.














is an absorbing set. In this interval there is a deadlock: a majority of committee
members would like to move the policy toward
_
￿m, but in￿ ation rates above the status quo are
not put on the agenda by p. A policy change can only occur when the status quo is su¢ ciently








, the agenda setter chooses
the policy closest to his ideal point subject to the constraint that the median will accept it.
The constraint is binding in equilibrium. That is, the median will be indi⁄erent between the
status quo and the policy that p proposes. Since the utility of the median is symmetric, this
proposal is equal to 2
_
￿m￿q, the re￿ ection point of q with respect to
_
￿m: For the most extreme
status quo policies, convergence to the agenda setter￿ s ideal point is complete.
Note that the proposal policy that we have just discussed is identical to the one obtained
by Romer and Rosenthal (1978), who analyzed the static version of our agenda-setting game.
19This is not surprising since the pro￿le described in Proposition 1 is independent from ￿: In the
dynamic voting game with ￿ 2 (0;1); this is not going to be true anymore.
4.3 The General Model with ￿ 2 (0;1)
This section looks at the interesting case when policy makers have an incentive to deviate from
their announcements. The next proposition characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium of
our dynamic voting game when ￿ 2 (0;1):
PROPOSITION 2: Let ￿ 2 (0;1): Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists a
_
￿ < 1 such that


























Gp(q) = q; if q 2
￿_





































z(￿ + 1) ￿ 2￿(
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In equilibrium, proposals are approved and expectations are rational.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Figure 5 depicts the proposal strategy. The set of stationary policies is given by the
interval
￿_






. This interval contains in￿ ation rates that in absence of










in￿ ation in the standard Barro-Gordon model.25 As ￿ ! 1 the target in￿ ation for p becomes
time consistent, even when a commitment technology is not available.
25See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 402).
20Figure 5: Proposal Rule when ￿ 2 (0;1)
In our equilibrium, a steady state in￿ ation rate is reached, at the latest, in two periods.






x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1)
￿
the convergence to the steady state is
not monotonic. The committee ￿rst increases the in￿ ation rate to policy z. Only when the
status quo is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient from the vantage point of the median and of the agenda
setter, the committee can credibly lower the in￿ ation rate to a policy smaller than
_
￿m: (Later













x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1);￿max
￿
, the convergence to the
steady state is immediate. In the former case, the committee increases the in￿ ation rate to
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿); the best stationary policy from the vantage point of the agenda setter.




x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1); the committee lowers the in￿ a-
tion rate. Note that the higher the initial status quo, the larger the in￿ ation decrease that
the agenda setter is able to impose to the rest of the committee. Eventually, when the status
quo is su¢ ciently undesirable for most committee members, the agenda setter can propose
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿):
We now compare the proposal rules from Propositions 1 and 2. First, the interval of sta-
tionary in￿ ation rates is now
￿_





















are not static anymore because the long-run cost of an in-




x￿￿) does the long-run cost of a deviation outweigh the short-term bene￿t. The
21intuition for this result is similar to the one behind the example in Section 4.1.2.
The most notable di⁄erences with respect to the game with ￿ = 0 concern the proposal
strategy for states above
_




x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1), the agenda setter does
not propose the re￿ ection point of q with respect to
_
￿m. Proposals that are symmetric on
opposite sides of
_
￿m are not o⁄ered because the median would reject these proposals ex post,
thus generating unexpected in￿ ation. To make the median indi⁄erent between accepting and
rejecting, the agenda setter must o⁄er a policy that is closer to
_
￿m than q, thereby increasing
the in￿ ation cost of rejecting the proposal and decreasing the gain from the deviation.









x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1), the proposal is
_
￿m. However, for status quo




x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1); there are no proposals below the status
quo that are acceptable to m: this implies that the agenda setter cannot propose an in￿ ation









x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1) and
_





x￿￿)=(￿ + 1) is the default, the agenda setter proposes policy
_
￿m despite the fact
that the private sector expects no change: This deviation generates a surprise de￿ation which
is costly for both policy makers in the short run. However, when ￿ is su¢ ciently high this cost
would be compensated for by staying at
_







x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1)
￿
, the committee cannot credibly pass an in￿ ation decrease
and, on the other hand, cannot keep the status quo unchanged. To resolve this impasse, the only
remaining option would be for the committee to move to a higher in￿ ation rate; from where an







x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1)
￿
, the committee increases the in￿ ation rate to policy z, even
if this is costly in the current period for both the median and the agenda setter. It does so










there exists a Markov equilib-
rium where the agenda setter proposes, for example,
_
￿m: One can easily show that rejecting this proposal ex
post is a pro￿table deviation for m. Notice in fact that this rejection, which generates an in￿ ation surprise, has
no long-run cost for the median. In the next period the state variable will be the same as of today because the
status quo will not change. Then, since the proposal rule and the expectation rule are stationary, the agenda
setter will still propose an in￿ ation decrease.
22because in the next period, when the status quo is equal to z; the committee will decrease the
in￿ ation rate. The reason for these dynamics is that only when the status quo is su¢ ciently
undesirable, the committee can credibly lower the in￿ ation rate:
The condition in Proposition 2 which de￿nes z insures that the agenda setter does not want
to generate an in￿ ation surprise above z, which is costly by Assumption 1, in order to lower the
steady state the committee will move to. At policy z the agenda setter achieves the optimal
trade-o⁄ between the short-term cost of this deviation and the long-run bene￿t.27
The proof in the Appendix veri￿es that: (1) proposals are accepted by the committee; (2)
expectations are correct; and (3) the agenda setter does not deviate from Gp. To prove the latter
point, one needs to check all possible one-period deviations from Gp. Consider, for example, a
policy in the interval
￿_






: To show that this policy is static, we verify
that one-period deviations from this policy are either unpro￿table for p or not accepted by the
committee. First, we consider in￿ ation surprises within the interval
￿_







These deviations would be accepted by a majority of committee members, but they are not
proposed in equilibrium because they are not pro￿table for the agenda setter: the long-run cost
of moving permanently to a new absorbing state outweighs the one-shot bene￿t in employment
terms. Second, the agenda setter may consider an in￿ ation surprise above
_
￿m: Note that when
the status quo is greater than
_
￿m the threat of disagreement is not credible since the median
and the agenda setter (the two key players in the committee) are willing to lower the in￿ ation
rate. A deviation above
_
￿m results in a short-run cost for p (by Assumption 1), but it may
allow the agenda setter to move the steady state to a policy closer to his ideal point. Is this
proposal accepted by the median? In spite of a short-term bene￿t for the median (note that
for m the in￿ ation cost is not as large), this deviating proposal is necessarily costly for the
median in the long run (a better steady state for the agenda setter is a worse steady state for
the median). The proof veri￿es that the short-run bene￿t that m obtains by accepting this
proposal is smaller than the long-run cost. After showing that all pro￿table deviations are
rejected by the committee, we thus conclude that the strategy pro￿le described in Proposition
2 is indeed a stationary Markov equilibrium.
27The three terms in the condition that de￿nes z are the marginal in￿ ation cost of an in￿ ation surprise, the
current marginal bene￿t in terms of output, and the long-run in￿ ation bene￿t, respectively. To compute the




x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1):
234.4 A Case for Selecting a Liberal Agenda Setter
In this section, we will argue that committee decision making may help implement the utilitarian
optimum for the currency area, which we denote by ￿U. In Section 4.3, we characterized the
interval of static policies. If the utilitarian optimum belongs to that interval, a Grand Planner
would be able to implement ￿U by choosing ￿U as the initial status quo and by selecting an
agenda setter who is more conservative than the median. However, ￿U may not be a static
policy according to Proposition 2; typically, this occurs when ￿U >
_
￿m. In this case, we will
argue below that in order to implement ￿U, the Grand Planner has to choose an agenda setter
that is more liberal than the median and select ￿U as the initial status quo. To simplify the
characterization of the equilibrium, we assume that the ex ante optimal policy of the agenda
setter is ￿max; the maximal in￿ ation rate. The following assumption replaces Assumption 1.







￿m + [1 + ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]￿(
_
x ￿ ￿)=(￿ + 1): Policy maker b p is chosen to be the
agenda setter.
Proposition 3 posits a PEC for the game with b p as agenda setter.
PROPOSITION 3: Let ￿ 2 (0;1). Under Assumptions 2-3, the following proposal strategy Gb p
is sustained by a PEC:
Gb p(q) =
_









Gb p(q) = q; if q 2
￿_





In equilibrium, proposals are approved and expectations are rational.
Proof: See the Appendix.





x ￿ ￿) are static (i.e., they are on the 45-degree line). In Section 4.3, we showed
that any policy in the interval
￿_






is sustained by a PEC because the
agenda setter is not willing to propose a deviation. When ￿U 2
￿_






and Assumption 3 holds, the median, not the agenda setter, trades-o⁄the bene￿t of a deviation
24Figure 6: Proposal Rule of a Liberal Agenda Setter:
from ￿U versus the cost of remaining with the policy implemented after the one-period deviation.
If ￿U >
_
￿m + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(
_
x ￿ ￿), the short-run gain from the deviation does not compensate the
median for the long-run in￿ ation cost. Although deviations from ￿U are pro￿table for the
agenda setter in the short term as well as in the long term, these deviations are not proposed
since they would be rejected by the committee. Finally, when q <
_
￿m + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿) the
agenda setter obtains his preferred policy.28
This section reinforces the conclusion that commitment does not arise from having a conser-
vative proposer, but from the separation of powers between the median, who can veto a policy
change, and the agenda setter, who controls the agenda.
5 Conclusion
Our paper o⁄ers a rationale for delegating monetary policy to a committee dominated by a
strong chairman, who controls the agenda but is constrained to put his proposal to a vote.
We show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda-setting power is a way for
a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of committees is not time consistent.
This result is observed because deviations from the optimal plan may irreversibly alter, via the
28Whenever expectations move up before the voting game, the agenda setter is in a good bargaining position
because a rejection of his proposal would cause a costly de￿ ation surprise. This explains why the agenda setter
is able to propose his ideal policy.
25endogenous status quo, the bargaining power in future voting games. Taking future cost into
account, the agenda setter is not willing to deviate from his ex ante optimal policy.
It is important to note that the disciplinary role of the status quo is e⁄ective only when
the committee is composed of members with di⁄erent ex ante preferred policies. Having a
heterogenous committee is desirable in our model because it makes the threat of disagreement
after a deviation credible and, consequently, may deter deviations from the ex ante optimal
policy. To the best of our knowledge, this ￿nding is an original contribution of this paper.
However, if we were to design a committee in practice, some caution would be in order as the
bene￿t of polarization should be put in balance with its possible costs, such as greater status quo
bias in response to changing economic conditions and more di¢ cult information aggregation.29
Throughout this paper, we have focused on policy making in monetary committees. We
expect that the main intuition underlying our results would continue to hold in other contexts
where credibility problems arise. For example, one could study a model of legislative bargaining
in which policy makers vote over the current capital tax. As it is well known (see, for example,
Fisher, 1980), the optimal tax on capital under commitment is not, in general, time consistent.
This application is likely, however, to present a few challenges. First, the model would be less
tractable because besides the political state variable (the status quo), strategies would also
depend on the economic state variable (the current level of capital). Moreover, the optimal
policy under commitment will not, in general, be constant over time, but will depend on the
stock of capital.
We conclude by indicating a possible direction for future research. It may be reasonable
to introduce uncertainty in our model. For instance, we could suppose that shocks change the
ex ante optimal policy of each committee member. In this case, uncertainty would change the
trade-o⁄ between the short-run bene￿t and the long-run cost of surprising the public, thereby
a⁄ecting the set of time consistent policies. Moreover, uncertainty may concern the distribution
of power within the committee (e.g., the identity of the agenda setter). It has been said that
trigger strategy and ￿reputation models ... overexplain good outcomes￿(Phelan, 2003), since
they predict that good policies will always be implemented. Introducing uncertainty might
29There is now a growing literature on information sharing in heterogenous committees. Coughlan (2000)
shows that when committee members have di⁄erent biases and these biases are known, full information aggre-
gation is problematic. See, also, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
26then explain why governments seem to break promises unpredictably. For now, we leave this
extension to future research.
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27APPENDIX
A.1
Before proving Propositions 1,2 and 3, we show that the median is decisive, in the sense
that a proposal is passed if and only if the median accepts it. First, we prove the following
lemma:30
LEMMA 1: Let fe ￿sg
1
s=t and fb ￿sg
1
s=t be two policy sequences starting from an arbitrary time
t and for an arbitrary ￿e
t: The di⁄erence between the utilities associated to the two sequences is
a monotone function of ￿i:
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: To begin with, notice that subsequent expectations from time t+1
onwards coincide with the actual in￿ ation rate because expectations correctly anticipate the
equilibrium outcome after any history, not just along the equilibrium path. We write down the




















































s(b ￿s ￿ e ￿s):
Since the derivative does not depend on ￿i, it follows that the di⁄erence in utility among any
two sequences is monotone in ￿i: ￿
30I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this Lemma, which shortened the original proofs.
28We can now prove that the median is decisive.
PROPOSITION A1: A proposal is accepted if and only if it is accepted by the median.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION A1: Let Gp denote the proposal rule that all voting represen-
tatives expect from the agenda setter. The current proposal is denoted by x. First, notice that,
knowing Gp, each voting representative is able to foresee all the policies that the committee will
implement if the current proposal is passed. The utility associated to this sequence is compared
to the one obtained if the current status quo is kept for one more period. We now prove our
proposition. Suppose that the median accepts proposal x. Then, by Lemma 1, all committee
members that are either to the right or to the left of m also accept x: Therefore, since m is the
median, the proposal is passed. The ￿only if￿part is equally straightforward. Indeed, suppose
by way of contradiction that the majority of members that accept a proposal does not include
the median. This clearly contradicts Lemma 1.
A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Step 1: For all q 2 X, Gp(q) is accepted by a majority of committee members.

















are accepted by the entire committee simply because the current




, the coalition that approves the
proposal Gp(q) includes all policy makers i with i ￿ m.
We now check that there are no pro￿table deviations from the proposal strategy Gp. Exploit-
ing the one-shot deviation principle, we consider one period deviations from Gp and assume that,
in the continuation game following a deviation, the committee plays according to the posited
strategy pro￿le Gp.





























, the proposal is
_
￿p. Clearly, the agenda setter cannot
improve upon that.







Let x denote a deviating proposal. The only deviations that would increase, for su¢ -







These deviations, while costly in the short run for the agenda setter, are bene￿cial in the
long run since they lower the steady state. Consider the policy sequence induced by x:
fx;Gp(x);Gp(Gp(x));:::g. This sequence is compared by the committee to fq;Gp(q);Gp(Gp(q));:::g:






. It follows from Proposition
A1 that these proposals are not passed.
Therefore, we conclude that the strategy pro￿le described in Proposition 1 is a PEC: ￿
30A.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Before analyzing the dynamic game and proving Proposition 2, we make a few statements
concerning the static game.
LEMMA 2: Suppose that expectations are equal to q: Betraying private expectations and im-
plementing policy x is weakly pro￿table for policy maker i in the current period if and











PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Assume ￿e = q: We are looking for all proposals that make
betraying private expectations pro￿table in the one-shot game. That is, we look for all the






















The left-hand side is the (current-period) utility of deviating from ￿e = q; while the right-hand
side is the (current-period) utility of not betraying private expectations. Since the left hand
side is concave in x; the set of pro￿table deviating proposals is the interval between the two






1+￿ : Furthermore, notice that betraying private

















1+￿ is the size of the largest pro￿table deviation from ￿e = q.
Notice that this expression can be negative: that is, i can gain from a de￿ ation surprise.




x ￿ ￿), then policy maker i gains in the current




x ￿ ￿), then policy maker i gains




x ￿ ￿); no deviation is pro￿table in the current
period.




x ￿ ￿) is the Nash
equilibrium in the one-shot game.








￿m is such that when ￿e 2
￿_






and ￿e = q, the agenda setter does not
gain in the current period by proposing an in￿ ation rate greater than
_
￿m:
31COROLLARY 2: Let q 2
￿_






and ￿e = q; the agenda setter su⁄ers a
utility loss in the current period by implementing a policy strictly greater than
_
￿m:






1+￿ , the largest pro￿table
deviation found in Lemma 2, is decreasing in q given that ￿ 2 (0;1): As a result, to prove
Corollary 2 it is enough to check that the largest pro￿table deviation is smaller than or equal to
_
￿m when the status quo is
_
￿p +(1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x￿￿), the smallest state in the interval. This follows
from Assumption 1. ￿






￿￿1 < q; where q is the current status quo. Pol-
icy maker i is indi⁄erent between keeping the status quo (thereby generating unexpected
in￿ation q￿￿e > 0) and con￿rming expectations by choosing ￿e.







￿￿1 the largest possible deviation is q itself, which gives i the same util-
ity as choosing ￿e. ￿









give i a strictly lower
utility than ￿e.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: First, we verify that Gp is accepted by n+1
2 representatives.









the median does not reject Gp(q) because a rejection
would have an employment cost (due to the surprise de￿ ation) as well as an in￿ ation cost. When
q 2
￿_






the agenda setter proposes the status quo. In this interval,











, the committee accepts Gp(q) to remain in o¢ ce. This follows














the median has no incentive to reject Gp(q) according to Corollary 3.
In the remaining steps, we will check that the agenda setter does not deviate from the
proposal strategy Gp: Each step focuses on a particular subset of the state space. However, for
32each subset we will consider deviations to the entire policy space. As before, we will assume that
in the continuation game following a deviation the committee plays according to the posited
strategy pro￿le Gp.

















, the posited proposal is
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿).




x￿￿) are not pro￿table for the agenda
setter. In fact, notice that these deviations have no cost in the long run, since in the next period
according to Gp the outcome will be
_
￿p +(1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x￿￿); but they have a cost in the short run
by Lemma 2.
We consider deviations inside the interval
￿_






: We write down the
intertemporal utility of p on the interval
￿_






as a function of the proposal

























If the committee chooses x 2
￿_
















the employment boost only occurs in this period, since we assume that expectations correctly
anticipate the equilibrium outcome after any history (not just along the equilibrium path).
Moreover, deviating inside the interval
￿_






causes a permanent in￿ ation
cost, because the deviation moves toward static policies. When ￿e =
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿) the
intertemporal utility is decreasing on the interval
￿_






. This is why





not pro￿table either. They have a short-run cost for p from Corollary 2. Moreover, they do
not bene￿t p in the long run: in the very best scenario for p; the committee moves back to
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿):
Step 3: There exists a
_
￿1 < 1; such that for all ￿ ￿
_
￿1 there are no pro￿table deviations when
q 2
￿_







We consider di⁄erent cases.







According to Gp the status quo is proposed. Deviations to policies strictly lower than q
are pro￿table for p, since they lower the steady state in￿ ation rate. However, they would be
rejected by m, since they cause a drop in employment as well as a permanent decrease of the






are not proposed, since the intertemporal utility of p as a function of x, as we saw in the
previous step, is decreasing on the interval
￿_







Step 3:2: There exists a
_
￿1 < 1; such that for all ￿ ￿
_






















. After such a deviation,
Gp prescribes that the committee will move up to z (recall that z was de￿ned in Proposition 2)






￿￿1 in two periods: Let Ci(x;q) denote
the net utility for central banker i from deviation x when the status quo is q and ￿e = q: That



















Ci(x;q) = wi(x;q) + ￿wi(z;z) ￿ (1 + ￿)wi(q;q):
For brevity, we write Ci instead of Ci(x;q): Notice that Cp < 0 since the deviation is costly in
the short run for p by Corollary 2. The agenda setter deviates to x if and only if the current











After solving the above inequality, we obtain that a deviation is pro￿table if and only if q































; where ￿m = (Gp(z) ￿
_
￿m)2 ￿ 1￿￿



























34Note that z depends on ￿: Moreover, the limit of Gp(z) goes to
_
￿p when ￿ ! 1: At the
limit, as ￿ goes to 1; the median accepts deviation x only if q =
_
￿p, while the agenda setter
















































2￿￿1=2 (Cm) > ￿1:
This implies that there is a
_































These deviations are pro￿table in the long run for the agenda setter only if p proposes a






1+￿ : Compared to Case 2, it is easy to show that these deviations
are rejected by m: they have a long-run cost for policy maker m as well as a short-run cost (by
Lemma 2).
Step 4: There exists a
_
￿2 < 1; such that for all ￿ ￿
_












According to our proposal rule, expectations move to z: We must show that the com-















for a given ￿e and knowing that in the next pe-































We can verify that z maximizes the above expression when ￿e = z: At policy z the agenda
setter achieves the optimal trade-o⁄ between the short-term cost and the long-run bene￿t of




































￿+1 . Assumption 2 guarantees that the agenda




































￿m: A pro￿table deviation for p would be to propose x 2 (q;￿max].
These deviations are rejected by m by Lemma 2.














this step is equivalent to proving Step 2, which showed that p has no incentive to deviate when
￿e =
_
￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(
_
x ￿ ￿).








A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3









the proposal is accepted (at least) by all i ￿ m by
Assumption 2. When q 2
￿_




proposal Gb p(q) is accepted by all policy
makers.
Step 2: We show that the agenda setter does not want to deviate from Gb p(q).









The agenda setter has no incentive to propose lower in￿ ation rate and cannot propose larger
in￿ ation rate. When q 2
￿_




; deviations above the status quo are
rejected by m following what we showed in Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2: in fact, in the
interval
￿_




the intertemporal utility of m is decreasing in the current
proposal.
The two steps above imply that the strategy pro￿le described in Proposition 3 is a PEC.
￿
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